Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 44
Number 3 Spring 2011—Supreme Court:
October Term 2009

Article 6

3-1-2011

Relatively Unguided: Examining the Precedential Value of the
Plurality Decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
Allstate Insurance Co., and Its Effects on Class Action Litigation
Andrew J. Kazakes
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew J. Kazakes, Relatively Unguided: Examining the Precedential Value of the Plurality Decision in
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., and Its Effects on Class Action Litigation,
44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1049 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol44/iss3/6

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

RELATIVELY UNGUIDED:
EXAMINING THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF
THE PLURALITY DECISION IN SHADY GROVE
ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCIATES V. ALLSTATE
INSURANCE CO., AND ITS EFFECTS ON CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION
Andrew J. Kazakes∗
I. INTRODUCTION
“In the sky, there is no distinction of east and west; people
create distinctions out of their own minds and then believe
them to be true.”
—Buddha
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.1 is
the latest installment in the U.S. Supreme Court’s ongoing struggle
to articulate a coherent analytical distinction between substantive and
procedural rules as interpreted by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2
and its progeny (“the Erie doctrine”). While the Court cobbled
together majority support for the judgment that in diversity cases
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”) conflicted with and
preempted a New York statutory prohibition against certain class
action lawsuits, the justices divided sharply over the proper rationale
supporting that result. By issuing a plurality opinion, the Court
layered precedential uncertainty on doctrinal ambiguity. Decoding
what Shady Grove means for Erie doctrine jurisprudence requires
careful evaluation under the narrowest-grounds doctrine that the
∗ J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; M.A., University of Chicago; B.A.,
Swarthmore College. The author thanks Dean Michael Waterstone and the editors and staff of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
1. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Court set forth in Marks v. United States.3 This Comment seeks to
determine what precedential consequences follow from Shady Grove
under the Marks doctrine and what such consequences will mean for
future applications of the Erie doctrine—in particular for state class
action litigation.
Part II provides a summary of the Court’s decision in Shady
Grove. Part III provides a brief overview of the Erie doctrine in
preparation for the discussion of the Court’s fragmented Shady
Grove opinion in Part IV. Part V analyzes the precedential import of
Shady Grove under the narrowest-grounds doctrine and then
discusses the implications of Shady Grove for the Erie doctrine and
for class action litigation in light of the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA). Part VI concludes.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After an automobile accident, Sonia E. Galvez received medical
treatment from Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates (“Shady
Grove”), a Maryland corporation.4 Galvez assigned to Shady Grove
her rights to recover insurance benefits under her insurance policy,
issued in New York by Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”), an
Illinois corporation.5 Shady Grove submitted a claim to Allstate.6
Under New York law, the claim would be subject to statutory interest
of two percent per month if Allstate failed to pay or deny benefits
within thirty days.7 Allstate paid late but refused to remit statutory
interest, which amounted to roughly $500.8
Alleging that Allstate routinely failed to remit statutory interest,
Shady Grove brought a class action suit in the Eastern District of
New York on behalf of itself and other putative class members,
claiming diversity jurisdiction.9 The district court found that statutory
interest constituted a statutory “penalty” under New York law and

3. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). The Marks doctrine has been characterized by the Court as
“more easily stated than applied . . . .” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994).
4. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431.
5. Id. at 469–70.
6. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1436–37.
9. Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 469, 472.
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that section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules10
precluded any class action claim for such a penalty, even though
Rule 23 would not have barred the class action.11 Since Shady
Grove’s individual claim did not meet the federal amount-incontroversy requirement,12 the district court concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter.13
The Second Circuit affirmed on the basis that section 901(b) and
Rule 23 address different issues and therefore do not conflict.14 The
court reasoned that Rule 23 addresses prerequisites for class
certification,15 whereas section 901(b) limits the types of claims
eligible for class action treatment even if all of Rule 23’s
certification requirements are met. Therefore, the court reasoned,
section 901(b) is substantive, not procedural, and must be applied in
federal diversity cases pursuant to the Erie doctrine.16
III. THE ERIE DOCTRINE IN A NUTSHELL
To better understand the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady
Grove, it will be helpful to briefly review the Court’s vertical choiceof-law17 jurisprudence following the Court’s seminal decision in
Erie. In its most general formulation, the Erie doctrine provides that
federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction18 apply federal
10. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2010).
11. Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 472, 475.
12. To meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction, a
plaintiff must seek more than $75,000 in relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
13. Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
14. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 143–45 (2d Cir.
2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
15. The four prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23 are numerosity, typicality,
commonality, and adequacy of representation. Id. at 143. In addition, the type of claim must fall
into one of three categories. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b).
16. Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 143–45.
17. A “vertical choice-of-law” problem refers to a situation in which a court must decide
whether to apply a state or federal rule. A “horizontal choice-of-law” problem involves which of
two or more states’ laws should apply. The Supreme Court has ruled that a federal court should
apply the horizontal choice-of-law rules of the state in which the federal court sits. See Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
18. For the sake of brevity, all future references to federal court activity pertain to diversity
jurisdiction. The two general requirements for diversity jurisdiction are that the amount-incontroversy requirement is met and that there is complete diversity between the parties, meaning
that every plaintiff is a resident of a different state than every defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(2006). CAFA relaxed the complete diversity requirement for class actions in which more than
$5,000,000 is in controversy, authorizing diversity jurisdiction so long as any plaintiff is diverse
from any defendant (with some exceptions). Id. § 1332(d).
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procedural rules but state substantive law.19 The doctrine nominally
originated with the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie and has
developed through the Court’s interpretation of two federal statutes:
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (“the Rules of Decision Act”
or RDA)20 and the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 (“the Rules Enabling
Act” or REA).21 Under the Court’s pre-Erie jurisprudence, federal
courts had to apply state statutory law, but not state court decisions.22
Federal courts could thus ignore state court interpretations of state
statutes and impose an independent federal common law on the
states.23 Writing for the Court in Erie, Justice Brandeis declared that
“[t]here is no federal general common law” because the Constitution
does not confer power on either Congress or the federal courts to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state.24 In
reaching this result, the Court addressed the problem that litigants
were manipulating federal diversity jurisdiction to achieve desired
outcomes in federal court that were not possible under applicable
state law.25 Discouraging forum shopping and minimizing disparate
legal outcomes in state versus federal courts came to be known as the
“twin aims of Erie,”26 and they remain important policy touchstones
in most applications of the Erie doctrine.
At its core, Erie established a strong federalism principle: to
uphold the constitutional division of power between the state and
federal legal systems, federal courts were bound to apply the states’

19. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 465 (1965)).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”).
21. Id. § 2072.
22. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938) (discussing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 78. Some scholars have critiqued Justice Brandeis’ constitutional reasoning in Erie,
arguing that the commerce clause could be construed to confer such power. See Adam N.
Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of
Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 312–13 (2008).
25. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73–74 (discussing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), in which a Kentucky corporation
reincorporated in Tennessee for the purpose of manufacturing diversity jurisdiction to sue in
federal court on a contract void under Kentucky law).
26. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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own definitions of litigants’ substantive rights when sitting in
diversity.27 However, Erie provided little guidance to courts in the
critical determination of whether a particular state law should be
labeled substantive or procedural.28 To complicate matters, four years
before the Erie decision, Congress had passed the Rules Enabling
Act, which empowered federal courts to “prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure” and led to the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.29 Following Erie, the Court had to devise a
framework to promulgate uniform federal rules of procedure while
respecting state law in diversity cases.30
The Court eventually developed a bifurcated approach to
vertical choice-of-law questions. In Hanna v. Plumer,31 a case
involving a conflict between federal and state service of process
standards, 32 the Court established two distinct analyses depending on
whether a vertical choice-of-law question was guided or unguided.33
A court faces an unguided Erie choice if no Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Federal Rule”)34 covers the legal issue presented or the
Federal Rule is invalid.35 In an unguided Erie choice, a court must
choose between applying a state procedural rule or a judicially
created federal procedural standard based on which of the two would
best further Erie’s twin policy aims.36 If, after weighing these twin
27. See id. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing Erie as “one of the modern
cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial
power between the state and federal systems”); see also Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (“Erie R.[R.] Co. v. Tompkins has been applied with an eye alert to essentials
in avoiding disregard of State law in diversity cases in the federal courts. A policy so important to
our federalism must be kept free from entanglements with analytical or terminological niceties.”).
28. See Steinman, supra note 24, at 258–61.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006); Steinman, supra note 24, at 260.
30. Steinman, supra note 24, at 258.
31. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
32. Id. at 461.
33. Id. at 471 (“When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing
the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie Choice.” (italics added)).
34. This Comment follows other Erie scholarship in using the capitalized term “Federal
Rule” to refer to true Federal Rules of Civil Procedure passed in accordance with the Rules
Enabling Act, as distinguished from other federal rules, such as those derived from the principle
of stare decisis. See Steinman, supra note 24, at 261 n.104.
35. Some commentators have questioned the clarity of the distinction between guided and
unguided Erie choices. Steinman, supra note 24, at 282–83 (noting that because the meaning of a
Federal Rule is largely determined not by the Rule’s text but by judicial gloss, there is a
surprisingly strong argument for treating choices between state law and Federal Rules as
unguided).
36. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
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aims, a court concludes that the choice of rules would be “outcomeaffective,” the state rule is deemed to be substantive and to apply in
federal court, provided there is no countervailing federal interest in
maintaining a uniform system of federal procedural rules.37
A court faces a guided Erie choice when a legal issue is fully
covered by an existing Federal Rule or another established federal
procedural doctrine.38 Under this analysis, a court must first decide if
the Federal Rule directly conflicts with the state rule by determining
if applying the Federal Rule would leave any room for the state
rule’s operation.39 In making this determination, the court considers
if the Federal Rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid a conflict.40
If a direct collision between the Federal Rule and state law is
unavoidable, then the Federal Rule prevails and displaces the state
law pursuant to the supremacy clause,41 provided that the Federal
Rule is both constitutional (construed to mean that it is “rationally
capable of classification” as procedural)42 and compliant with the
REA, which mandates that applying a Federal Rule shall not
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”43 The Supreme
Court has struggled to interpret the scope and meaning of this REA
language. In particular, the Court has had difficulty articulating a
coherent distinction between cases in which a Federal Rule
incidentally (but permissibly) affects litigation outcomes and those in
which a Federal Rule impermissibly alters litigants’ substantive
rights.44
The Supreme Court’s previous attempts to draw this line led to
equivocation concerning whether courts should only evaluate the
37. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (citing Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
38. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471–72. While guided Erie choices typically involve a Federal Rule,
it is not a prerequisite. See Steinman, supra note 24, at 261.
39. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at
471–72).
40. The Court has never found a Federal Rule invalid under the REA and appears to prefer
either applying the Federal Rule or interpreting the Federal Rule to avoid a conflict. See Lucas
Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in Federal Class Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV.
285, 296 (2010); see, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 817, 842, 845 (1999)
(interpreting Rule 23 to “minimize[] potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act”).
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see Steinman, supra note 24, at 312.
42. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
44. Steinman, supra note 24, at 270.
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procedural nature of a given Federal Rule or should also evaluate the
threatened state law’s significance to state definitions of substantive
rights. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,45 the Court stated that a Federal
Rule complies with the REA if it “really regulates procedure.”46 The
Sibbach Court held that Rule 35, which requires a party to submit to
a physical examination if physical condition is at issue in the case,
regulated procedure and therefore trumped a conflicting Illinois rule
prohibiting such examinations.47 In so holding, the Court rejected the
argument that applying the Federal Rule would violate the
petitioner’s substantive right to be free from bodily intrusion under
Illinois law.48 The Court concluded that a standard that focused on
the importance of the state right threatened with displacement, rather
than on whether the Federal Rule covered the litigation’s procedural
aspects, would force courts to pass judgment on the relative value of
the policies underlying state laws and thereby “invite endless
litigation and confusion worse confounded.”49 In contrast, the Court
in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.50 noted that in deciding
whether a Federal Rule should trump state law, “[f]ederal courts
have interpreted the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important
state interests and regulatory policies.”51 This doctrinal gap is what
drove the Court to plurality in Shady Grove.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A majority of the Court in Shady Grove agreed that section
901(b) and Rule 23 actually conflicted. Facing a guided Erie
choice,52 a majority of the Court agreed that Rule 23 was valid under
the REA and that section 901(b) was not a substantive rule.
However, the Court failed to reach a consensus about the proper
45. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
46. Id. at 14 (defining procedure as “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them”).
47. Id. at 14–16.
48. Id. at 11. The Court also refused petitioner’s proposed standard that “substantive” state
rights should be construed to mean “important” or “substantial” rights under the state law
scheme. Id.
49. Id. at 14.
50. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
51. Id. at 428 n.7.
52. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468, 471 (1965); Steinman, supra note 24, at 282–83;
see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432.
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standard to apply in distinguishing between procedural and
substantive rules generally. In particular, the Court struggled to
decide whether a state procedural rule that is “bound-up with” a
state’s definition of substantive rights is cognizable under the Court’s
Erie analysis.53
Justice Scalia’s lead opinion garnered mixed support, with
division in the Court cutting across ideological lines. The numerical
breakdown in votes was as follows: five votes for the result that
section 901(b) conflicts with and is preempted by Rule 23—with a
4–1 split in the reasoning used to reach the result and Justice Stevens
writing separately; three votes supporting Justice Scalia’s rebuttal to
Justice Stevens’ concurrence (with Justice Sotomayor withdrawing
support); and four votes in dissent.54
A. Majority Support for the Result: Justice Scalia’s Lead Opinion
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the
Second Circuit’s distinction between certifiability and eligibility as
artificial, observing that both Rule 23 and section 901(b) address the
same question: whether a litigant may maintain a class action
lawsuit.55 Justice Scalia read into the language of Rule 23 a litigant’s
affirmative entitlement to proceed with a class action if the litigant
meets Rule 23’s prerequisites.56 Since section 901(b) precluded
Shady Grove from proceeding with its class action even if it met
Rule 23’s prerequisites, the two rules unavoidably conflicted,
necessitating a guided Erie analysis.57 Justice Scalia concluded that
Rule 23 is consistent with the REA because applying Rule 23 would
53. Compare Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444–
47 & nn.9–15 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (arguing against cognizability), with Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453–55 & nn.8–14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (arguing for limited cognizability).
54. Justice Scalia received majority support with respect to Parts I and II-A of his opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Stevens. Id. at 1435.
Justice Sotomayor withdrew support for Part II-C, and Justice Stevens withdrew support for Parts
II-B through II-D, submitting a separate concurring opinion. Id. Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy,
Breyer, and Alito joined in dissent. Id.
55. Id. at 1437–38. Section 901(b) closely tracks Rule 23’s class certification criteria. Id. at
1464 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1442 (Scalia, J., majority opinion). Justice Scalia argued that section 901(b)’s
additional subject-matter limitations could not be harmonized with Rule 23 because Rule 23
“authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal civil proceeding to maintain a class action if the Rule’s
prerequisites are met.” Id.
57. Id. at 1439.
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not affect any plaintiff’s substantive right to pursue statutory
penalties individually; rather, it would only affect class members’
ability to pool their individual claims into one lawsuit.58
B. Doctrinal Disconnect: Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens’
Disagreement over the Cognizability of State Policy Interests
While Justice Scalia corralled majority support for his
disposition of the case, he lost Justice Stevens’ support for his
approach to analyzing whether a Federal Rule complies with the
REA. According to Justice Scalia, courts should follow Sibbach by
limiting REA analysis to determining whether a Federal Rule “really
regulates procedure” and disregarding the nature of the state law
threatened with displacement.59 A Federal Rule “really regulates
procedure,” in Justice Scalia’s view, if it governs “the manner and
the means by which the litigants’ rights are enforced” but does not
alter the rules of decision by which courts adjudicate those rights.60
While acknowledging that this categorical approach encourages
forum shopping,61 Justice Scalia maintained that such a result is a
tolerable price to pay to preserve a uniform system of federal
procedural rules.62
Justice Stevens wrote separately to express a different
conception of the REA analysis that courts should follow. Justice
Stevens’ disagreement with Justice Scalia concerned whether courts
should scrutinize the policies behind a conflicting state rule to ensure
that a facially procedural rule does not actually define the contours of
state substantive rights.63
Justice Stevens’ concurrence seems to straddle the judgment of
58. Id. at 1443 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
59. Id. at 1444 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1941)).
60. Id. at 1442 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree,
326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)).
61. Claims based in state law that would be barred under the same state’s procedural rules
could still be maintained if brought in federal court. Id. at 1447.
62. Id. at 1447–48.
63. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). As an
illustration, Justice Stevens noted that a statute of limitations is procedural in the sense that it only
governs a plaintiff’s ability to access court procedures to enforce separately defined substantive
rights. However, a statute of limitations also defines the temporal scope of a plaintiff’s
substantive rights and expresses the state’s policy judgment about a tortfeasor’s right to repose, to
be free from the perpetual threat of lawsuit. See id. at 1453 n.9; see also Guaranty Trust Co. of
N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (applying state statute of limitations in federal diversity case).
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the Court and the reasoning of the dissent.64 Observing that the line
separating substance from procedure is often hazy, Justice Stevens
argued that courts must determine whether a seemingly procedural
rule is “so bound up” or “intertwined” with substantive rules that it
defines the scope of state rights or remedies.65 Courts must therefore
be “sensitiv[e] to important state interests” when faced with a guided
Erie choice.66 Because “[i]n some instances, a state rule that appears
procedural really is not,” this approach ensures that applying a
Federal Rule does not trammel a state rule of procedure that
inextricably contributes to a state’s definition of substantive rights.67
Making this determination requires evaluating on a case-by-case
basis how a state procedural rule fits into the state’s statutory scheme
and how it relates to the state policies that the scheme was designed
to promote. Justice Stevens set a high threshold for such a finding,
limiting the determination to those rare cases in which there is “little
doubt” that the procedural rule helps define substantive rights.68
Concluding that section 901(b) did not constitute one of those rare
instances, Justice Stevens joined in the judgment that Rule 23
displaces section 901(b) in federal court.69
The resulting debate between the justices concerned whether
federal courts should ever countenance state procedural rules that are
inextricably bound up with substantive state rights and remedies.
Justice Scalia contended that federal courts should never do so, citing
concerns over judicial economy and doctrinal clarity.70 In Justice
64. Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Scalia that section 901(b) is unequivocally
procedural, in direct conflict with Rule 23, and therefore preempted by Rule 23. However, Justice
Stevens also agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s argument that federal courts sitting in diversity must
sometimes apply state procedural rules when such rules define substantive rights and remedies.
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Stevens’ analysis subtly differs from Justice Ginsburg’s because Justice Stevens endorses
looking at state substantive policies to determine whether a Federal Rule complies with the REA
after concluding that the federal and state rules conflict, whereas Justice Ginsburg would apply
this analysis to determine whether a conflict exists. See Max W. Berger & Geoffrey Brounell,
Shady Grove and the Future of State-Law Restrictions on Class Action Lawsuits, in CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION STRATEGIES 2010, at 281, 302 n.141 (Jayne A. Goldstein & Howard S.
Suskin eds., 2010).
65. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450, 1452–53, 1455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
66. Id. at 1452.
67. Id. at 1453 n.8.
68. Id. at 1457.
69. Id. at 1456.
70. Id. at 1445 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). According to Justice Scalia, federal judges
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Scalia’s view, Justice Stevens’ case-by-case, purpose-driven
approach is unworkable and contrary to the Court’s Sibbach
precedent.71 Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia’s view as
incompatible with the language of the REA, which requires courts to
do more than simply focus on whether the Federal Rule at issue
“really regulates procedure.”72 Justice Stevens argued that a court
cannot know whether a Federal Rule “really regulates procedure”
without considering the nature and purpose of the state law that the
Federal Rule would displace.73
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
The dissent construed section 901(b) as a substantive cap on
damages and therefore argued that it did not conflict with Rule 23,
which only deals with class certification criteria. The dissent argued
that because section 901(b) makes little sense as a procedural rule, it
must be substantive in purpose. Because claims for statutory
damages do not require proof of actual damages, they are best suited
to the class action device.74 Section 901(b) therefore bears no relation
to judicial economy, a major policy purpose behind Rule 23.75
Instead, the New York legislature had two substantive purposes in
mind when it passed section 901(b): (1) to avoid excessive
compensation for plaintiffs76 and (2) to prevent plaintiffs from
exploiting this excess liability by bringing unmeritorious claims in
would be “condemned to poring through state legislative history.” Id. at 1441.
71. Id. at 1445–47 nn.9–10, nn.12–13.
72. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Stevens argued that Justice Scalia unnecessarily worried about the difficulty of determining
whether seemingly procedural state rules are bound up with substantive rights because facially
valid federal rules rarely conflict with such quasi-procedural state laws. Id. at 1455 n.13.
73. Id. at 1454 n.10.
74. Id. at 1464–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg began her dissent by
characterizing Shady Grove’s class action suit as a form of “alchemy” transforming a $500 case
into a $5,000,000 award. Id. at 1460. But see id. at 1459 n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (responding that Shady Grove transforms 10,000 $500 claims into
one $5,000,000 claim).
75. Id. at 1466–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1464–65. Both the class action device and statutory penalties are legislative tools
to make otherwise negative-value lawsuits—lawsuits in which the cost of bringing the lawsuit
exceeds individual expected recovery—worthwhile for plaintiffs. See Watkins, supra note 40, at
287 n.22, 294–95. However, when these two tools are combined, some argue, they can lead to
greater defendant liability than is necessary to overcome the problem of negative-value lawsuits,
creating excessive, and in some instances annihilative, liability. See id. at 294–95; Shady Grove,
130 S. Ct. at 1465 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the form of class action lawsuits as leverage to force settlement.77
The dissent further observed that New York courts have
routinely allowed class action suits to proceed when class members
waive the right to receive statutory damages, and they pursue only
actual damages.78 The dissent interpreted this to mean that section
901(b) is not directed at controlling whether certain class actions
may begin but rather at controlling how they end—in other words, it
determines what remedies are available to class litigants.79 Since
Rule 23 does not address this issue, Justice Ginsburg did not believe
that it conflicted with section 901(b)’s substantive limitation on
remedies.80 As a result, Justice Ginsburg would have affirmed the
Second Circuit’s judgment.81
While Justice Stevens’ analysis was similar to Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting argument, Justice Stevens criticized the
dissent’s view as an “end run around Congress’ system of uniform
federal rules.”82 While agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that the
Court’s Erie analysis should be sensitive to important state interests,
Justice Stevens nevertheless maintained that “the bar for finding an
[REA] problem is a high one.”83 Justice Stevens therefore
distinguished between procedural rules that are intimately bound up
with defining substantive state rights or remedies and procedural
rules adopted merely for some policy reason.84 Justice Stevens thus
rejected the dissent’s discussion of New York’s legislative history
with respect to section 901(b).85

77. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1467 n.9.
79. Id. at 1467–68.
80. Id. at 1468–69.
81. Id. at 1473.
82. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
83. Id. at 1456–57.
84. Id. at 1458.
85. Justice Stevens considered it evidence merely that the legislature was motivated by the
policy interest to limit the likelihood of crushing liability against class action defendants, rather
than a finding that section 901(b) defined state rights per se. Id. at 1458–59. After all, section
901(b) does not prohibit a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for statutory interest—it only prohibits
doing so in a class format. Id. Justice Scalia also rejected the dissent’s “purpose-driven” analysis
as misguided on the ground that it could lead to inconsistent results between two identically
worded state statutes when one state legislature evinces a substantive intent while the other does
not. Id. at 1440–41 (Scalia, J., majority opinion).

Spring 2011]

SHADY GROVE V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. 1061

V. ANALYSIS: LIMITED PRECEDENT UNDER THE
NARROWEST-GROUNDS DOCTRINE BUT POTENTIALLY
BROAD EFFECTS ON CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Under the narrowest-grounds doctrine, Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens’ plurality opinions likely carry no precedential weight and
should be viewed as persuasive authority only. Even if it is limited to
its facts, however, Shady Grove will resonate in the class action
litigation context because the Court’s reasoning suggests that other
state efforts to regulate class actions may be prone to attack in
federal court.
A. Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens’ Concurring Opinions
Lack a Rational Common Denominator Under the
Narrowest-Grounds Doctrine
At common law, the precedential weight of a plurality decision
was limited only to the particular result.86 Lower courts could
therefore ignore the various rationales provided in plurality decisions
and would only have to follow such decisions in future cases
presenting substantially the same narrow factual situation.87 In
Marks, the Supreme Court issued its only official guidance for
determining the precedential scope of the Court’s plurality
decisions.88 The Court reconsidered the precedential value of its
previous plurality decision in A Book Named “John Cleland’s
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of
Massachusetts, 89 concluding that “[w]hen a fragmented Court
decides a case . . . the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on

86. Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision:
Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 278 (2000).
87. Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A
Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97,
104–05 (2007).
88. Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1603 (1992). While beyond the scope of this Comment, legal scholars
have proposed a variety of alternative models for determining the precedential value of plurality
opinions. See Cacace, supra note 87 (applying social choice theory to interpretation of plurality
opinions); Kimura, supra at 1600–24 (proposing five-category system for identifying the
precedential value of a plurality decision).
89. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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the narrowest grounds.”90 This section summarizes how courts and
commentators have generally interpreted the narrowest-grounds
doctrine, and it then applies the resulting framework to the Shady
Grove decision. It concludes that the holding in Shady Grove should
be limited to its facts.
1. Narrowest-Grounds Requirements
Courts and commentators that have considered the meaning of
the Marks rule have concluded that Marks does not apply to all
plurality decisions, and they have generally identified two related
requirements in determining whether a narrowest ground exists in
such a decision.91 First, the narrowest-ground opinion must enjoy the
implicit support of a majority of the justices concurring in the
judgment.92 Dissenting opinions are excluded from consideration,
whatever their reasoning, because there is no logical nexus between a
dissenting opinion and the disposition of the case.93 Second, the
narrowest ground must be the logical subset of another broader
plurality opinion, so that each fits into the other “like Russian
dolls.”94 In other words, there must be a rational “common
denominator” underlying the opinions of those justices concurring in
the judgment.95 For example, a plurality opinion upholding a law
under rational basis review shares a logical common denominator
with a plurality opinion upholding the same law under strict scrutiny
because a law that survives under strict scrutiny ipso facto survives

90. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)).
91. Cacace, supra note 87, at 110; Kimura, supra note 88, at 1602–03.
92. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (specifying that only “those Members who concurred in the
judgments” can support a narrowest ground (emphasis added)).
93. See Cacace, supra note 87, at 111 & nn.111–14; Kimura, supra note 88, at 1602–03
(noting that reliance on dissenting opinions to construe the legal rule resulting from a case entails
that the disposition is not justified); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United
States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 328 (2000).
94. Cacace, supra note 87, at 111, 129–30; Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The
One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1993).
95. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 505 U.S.
1229 (1992); Rafael A. Seminario, Comment, The Uncertainty and Debilitation of the Marks
Fractured Opinion Analysis—The U.S. Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity: Grutter v.
Bollinger, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 739, 761 (2004); see, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
745 (1994) (citing three Courts of Appeals that found no rational common denominator, and
therefore no narrowest grounds representing the Court’s holding in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S.
222 (1980)).
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rational basis review.96 Those justices concluding that a law survives
strict scrutiny can be said to implicitly support the position that the
law survives rational basis review, resulting in a constructive
majority.
If the above two requirements are met but it is unclear which is
the narrower of two plurality decisions, the narrowest ground is
considered the opinion that will affect or control the fewest laws or
cases in the future.97 Thus, if the result of a plurality decision is to
uphold a law against constitutional attack, the opinion that would
uphold the fewest laws is the narrowest ground. If the result is to
invalidate a law, however, the opinion that would strike down the
fewest laws is the narrowest ground.98
2. Applying the Narrowest-Grounds Doctrine to Shady Grove
As a preliminary matter, the narrowest-grounds doctrine
excludes from consideration Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.99
It might be tempting to conclude that Justice Stevens’ approach is
controlling because he garnered the dissent’s implicit support.
However, this conclusion confuses the narrowest-grounds model of
plurality interpretation with the dual-majority model. A dual majority
occurs when the dissenting opinion and one of the concurring
opinions advocate the same legal rule (resulting in one majority for
the result and a separate majority for the legal rule—precisely what
occurred in Shady Grove).100 While there may be good arguments for
adopting the dual-majority model, it is analytically distinct from the
narrowest-grounds model that the Supreme Court selected in Marks.
Narrowest-grounds analysis does not count dissenting opinions

96. Kimura, supra note 88, at 1603–04. Some scholars have criticized the theory of implicit
support underlying the narrowest grounds doctrine. See Cacace, supra note 87, at 111 n.114;
Kimura, supra note 88, at 1604, 1616–18.
97. Cacace, supra note 87, at 111.
98. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 94, at 47. It is also worth mentioning that at least one
lower court has suggested that an opinion to which only a single justice subscribes can never
qualify as binding precedent. See King, 950 F.2d at 782 (“When eight of nine Justices do not
subscribe to a given approach to a legal question, it surely cannot be proper to endow that
approach with controlling force, no matter how persuasive it may be.”).
99. See King, 950 F.2d at 783 (“[W]e do not think we are free to combine a dissent with a
concurrence to form a Marks majority.”); Kimura, supra note 88, at 1602–03. But see Cacace,
supra note 87, at 111–12 (noting that some justices have analyzed dissenting opinions in
determining which test a lower court should apply).
100. See Kimura, supra note 88, at 1602–03.
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because to do so would delegitimize the result (which the dissent
opposed).101 Despite its partial alignment with Justice Stevens’
approach, the Shady Grove dissent cannot carry precedential
weight.102
The critical question is therefore whether a rational common
denominator exists between Justice Scalia’s and Justice Stevens’
concurrences. There appears to be none. The justices presented two
conflicting approaches to the same issue, with each justice criticizing
the other’s approach at length. Justice Scalia adamantly rejected the
proposition that courts should spend time investigating the legislative
intent behind state procedural rules, referring to such inquiries as
“standardless” and contrary to Sibbach.103 Conversely, Justice
Stevens argued that the only way courts can give meaning to the
REA limitation is to carefully examine whether the state procedural
rule is inextricably bound up with the state’s definition of substantive
rights. While Justice Stevens would set a high bar for finding a
Federal Rule incompatible with the REA, he nevertheless opens the
door to this analysis, which Justice Scalia does not.104
This conceptual disagreement is more than academic. The
dissent reached the opposite result using an approach similar to the
one that Justice Stevens advocated. In close cases, the weight
assigned to legislative intent determines whether state laws, and the
lawsuits invoking them, survive or perish.105 Given that Justices
Scalia and Stevens stake out opposite positions on this narrow but
critical issue, there is no rational common denominator between their
opinions. They represent parallel lines of analysis, each extending
from the facts to the result without meeting or touching each other.
Under the narrowest-grounds doctrine, therefore, their approaches
101. See id.
102. The dissent’s analysis substantively differs from Justice Stevens’ analysis with respect to
the point in a guided Erie analysis at which courts should consider state interests. Justice Stevens
would weigh state interests after concluding that a state law conflicted with a Federal Rule,
whereas Justice Ginsburg would consider state interests in determining if a conflict even existed.
Compare Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding no conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b)), with id. at
1455–57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the dissent’s
approach as “an end run around Congress’ system of uniform federal rules”).
103. Id. at 1441 n.7, 1445 n.9 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
104. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
105. See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-WP65000, 2010 WL 2756947, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010).
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constitute mere persuasive authority for lower courts.
Even assuming that Scalia’s and Stevens’ opinions did logically
overlap, it is unclear whether Stevens’ approach is the narrower of
the two.106 As between two methodologies used to decide which
jurisdiction’s law—the state’s or federal government’s—will
displace the other’s, scope is relative to jurisdiction. Justice Stevens’
approach is narrower in the sense that it would result in the
preemption of moderately fewer state laws, but also broader in the
sense that it would result in the displacement of federal law by an
equal number of state laws. Alternatively, it is unclear which of the
justices’ approaches would affect fewer cases.107 Viewed strictly in
the context of class certification, Scalia’s approach is arguably
narrower in that it would result in the decertification of fewer class
actions. In considering the consequence of the decision beyond the
class action context, however, it becomes difficult to predict which
of the two justices’ approaches would have less far-reaching effects
on litigation.
3. Missing the Marks: The Narrowest-Grounds
Doctrine as Applied to Shady Grove
In early decisions applying Shady Grove, courts have favored
Justice Stevens’ more flexible approach. However, their narrowestgrounds analyses have been anemic and sometimes nonexistent.
Several courts have purported to apply the narrowest-grounds
doctrine but concluded that Stevens’ approach constituted the
controlling “narrowest grounds” either because it was “critical” or
“crucial” to the result or because it accorded with the dissent, even
though a dissent ipso facto cannot support the Court’s disposition.108
106. See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 128 n.135), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1633541 (“[I]n Shady Grove the word “narrowest” has no clear meaning. . . . In any event, Marks
certainly did not mean to give a concurring Justice the power to hijack the law.”).
107. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
108. Garman ex rel. Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 08-8101, 2010 WL
5191359, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2010) (finding Justice Stevens’ concurrence “critical” because
he concluded the rule at issue was not part of substantive state law); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d
79, 86–89 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Justice Stevens’ concurrence); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust
Litig., No. 08-2433, 2010 WL 5186052, at *2–5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2010); see Estate of C.A. v.
Grier, No. H-10-0531, 2010 WL 4236865, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2010) (concluding that
Justice Stevens’ opinion was narrowest because his approach comported with the dissent);
Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *9–10 (M.D. Tenn. Aug.
16, 2010) (concluding that Justice Stevens’ concurrence was the narrowest grounds in Shady
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The misattribution of precedential authority to Justice Stevens’
plurality opinion illustrates that lower courts do not apply the
narrowest-grounds doctrine in a talismanic manner. While based on
principles of logic, the doctrine is often treated as a rule of
interpretation. In practice, lower courts rely on observations about
what other lower courts have decided109 and predictions about how
the Supreme Court would likely resolve a similar issue.110
However, reliance on Justice Stevens’ concurrence may not be
predictively accurate. Given Justice Stevens’ retirement, the Court’s
disposition on the same or similar Erie issue likely depends on newly
sworn-in Justice Kagan’s heretofore unknown views on the Erie
doctrine.111 Because Shady Grove leaves important methodological
issues unresolved, it seems likely that the Court will revisit its Erie
jurisprudence sooner rather than later.
B. Implications for Class Action Litigation and CAFA Policy
The Shady Grove decision renders state laws that bar categories
of class action claims vulnerable to preemption in federal court.112
Grove); In re Whirlpool Corp., 2010 WL 2756947, at *1–2 (partially decertifying a class on the
ground that Rule 23, while not ultra vires under Justice Scalia’s approach, was ultra vires under
Justice Stevens’ “crucial” concurrence). Other courts have cautiously applied both Justice
Scalia’s approach and Justice Stevens’ approach. Retained Realty, Inc. v. McCabe, 376 F. App’x
52, 55–56 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that Rule 54(b) superseded state law under either
Justice Scalia’s or Justice Stevens’ approaches); Durmishi v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d 862,
875–77 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (analyzing purported conflict with Rule 35 under both Justice Scalia’s
and Justice Stevens’ approaches).
109. When a plurality opinion befuddles lower courts and leads to inconsistent interpretations,
the Supreme Court may decline to apply Marks and instead issue a new ruling on the matter.
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), illustrates this practical dimension in applications
of Marks. In Nichols, the Court reconsidered its previous plurality decision in Baldasar v. Illinois,
446 U.S. 222 (1980), regarding the constitutionality of certain criminal sentencing enhancements.
Observing that the narrowest-grounds doctrine is “more easily stated than applied,” the Court, in
deciding to overrule Baldasar rather than subject it to a Marks analysis, wrote, “We think it not
useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously
baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it. This degree of confusion following a
splintered decision . . . is itself a reason for reexamining that decision.” Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–
46. The Marks decision itself implicitly acknowledged that lower court consensus is a factor
relevant to determining whether the narrowest-grounds doctrine is useful in analyzing particular
plurality decisions. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977) (noting that “every
Court of Appeals that considered the question” reached the same conclusion as what the Marks
Court concluded was the narrowest grounds in Memoirs).
110. See Hochschild, supra note 86, at 279–80; Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 94, at 45.
111. See Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie
Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript
at 43 n.237), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677392.
112. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brief for
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The decision also raises many questions, three of which are
discussed below. First, what does Shady Grove mean for the Court’s
attitude toward CAFA policy? Second, will Shady Grove preclude
state law caps on class action damages or only categorical bars on
maintaining class actions? Finally, will Shady Grove limit other state
regulations on class actions, such as state laws that augment class
certification standards?
1. Shady Grove and CAFA policy
Many commentators have noted that the motivation behind
CAFA was to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring class
action claims.113 Congress passed CAFA partly in response to
concerns that state court judges were overeager to certify class
actions because of political pressures tied to local judicial
elections.114 By allowing class action defendants to remove state class
action claims to federal court, CAFA allowed defendants to take
advantage of the federal courts’ more stringent standards for class
certification.115 Shady Grove does the opposite. By allowing plaintiffs
to avoid restrictive state laws, the decision signals movement toward
greater judicial leeway for class action plaintiffs bringing state law
claims in federal court.116
However, Shady Grove does not repudiate CAFA policy so
much as soften its edges. First, legislative history indicates that
Congress was motivated not just to limit the quantity of class action
lawsuits but also to federalize suits with effects on the nation as a

Respondent app. B, Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (No. 93-106) (listing state statutes prohibiting
class actions for particular claims).
113. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2525 n.42 (2008); Steinman, supra note 24, at 304 n.313.
114. See Burch, supra note 113, at 2526. By bringing a class action in a “judicial hellhole,” a
class action attorney secured the best possible chance to have that class certified. See Georgene
Vairo, Why I Don’t Teach Federal Courts Anymore, But Maybe Am or Will Again, 53 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 843, 850 (2009); Kimberly Nakamaru, Comment, Touching a Nerve: Hertz v. Friend’s
Impact on the Class Action Fairness Act’s Minimum Diversity Requirement, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1019, 1028 (2011).
115. Burch, supra note 113, at 2531 (reporting that state courts denied certification in
12 percent of cases remanded from federal court while federal courts denied certification in
27 percent of cases in which defendants removed to federal court).
116. In response, Justice Ginsburg suggested that Congress amend CAFA to prohibit
maintenance of a class action in federal court that would be barred in the state under whose laws
the class action is brought. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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whole.117 In this sense, Shady Grove is consistent with CAFA policy
because the decision extends divestiture of the states’ control over
class action litigation.118 Assuming that some class actions barred by
state laws like section 901(b) would have national import, such laws
frustrate rather than further this aspect of CAFA policy. Second,
Shady Grove likely will not alter the federal courts’ present rate of
decertification.119 While it expands forum access for class action
plaintiffs, Shady Grove may be a pyrrhic victory for many litigants as
district judges will likely review with heightened skepticism class
certification requests that would have been barred under the laws of
the states under which the class claims arose.
2. Shady Grove and Caps on Class Action Damages
In Gasperini, the Court suggested that a statutory cap on
damages for a particular cause of action would likely be considered
substantive under Erie analysis.120 The dissent in Shady Grove
accurately observed that Justice Scalia tied the result in Shady Grove
to the fact that section 901(b) acts to categorically bar certain class
actions from being maintained.121 Shady Grove thus appears facially
agnostic about the federal preemption of state law damages caps.
However, there is a lower threshold at which a damages cap would
obviously function as a complete prohibition. For example, if section
901(b) limited statutory damages to the amount the class
representative could recover individually, the statute would
nominally permit a class action to be “maintained” but would
117. See Burch, supra note 113, at 2525–26.
118. Whereas CAFA was viewed as an attempt to muzzle overzealous state court judges,
Shady Grove can be viewed as reclaiming power from state legislatures.
119. See supra note 115.
120. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996); see Shady Grove, 130
S. Ct. at 1439 n.4 (“[W]e express no view as to whether state laws that set a ceiling on damages
recoverable in a single suit . . . are pre-empted.”) (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 112,
app. A); id. at 1466 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress, in authorizing
promulgation of the Federal Rules, could not have intended to displace state-created damages
caps).
121. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia himself
declined to address what his opinion in Shady Grove would have been if the state law at issue
imposed a cap on damages instead of a categorical bar. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., majority opinion)
(“We need not decide whether a state law that limits the remedies available in an existing class
action would conflict with Rule 23.”). However, Justice Scalia also characterized Rule 23 as
creating an entitlement to proceed with a class action so long as Rule 23’s requirements for class
certification are met. Id. at 1438.
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perform the same function as a categorical bar to the class action
device.122 A state legislature writing a well-calibrated statute would
of course set the cap high enough to avoid the appearance of
obstructionism while rendering most class actions economically
inhospitable to plaintiffs.123
Even a well-calibrated state damages cap could arguably fall
within the purview of Shady Grove, however, if it caused excessive
interference with Rule 23’s certification requirements. With lower
damages caps, class action plaintiffs may be forced as a practical
matter to bring class actions with fewer class members. For instance,
if individual claims in a class action for fraud averaged $2,000
apiece, and the state imposed a $50,000 damages cap on that type of
claim, then a class action with more than twenty-five class members
would dilute the potential per-plaintiff recovery. Proceeding with
twenty-five or fewer class members risks decertification for lack of
numerosity. Alternatively, if a class action attorney decided to move
forward with more than twenty-five class members to satisfy the
numerosity requirement, the diluting effect of adding class members
would risk decertification under two Rule 23 provisions. Under Rule
23(a)(4), it is questionable whether the class action attorney can
“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” when the
very structure of the litigation will result in the undercompensation
of class members.124 Similarly, under Rule 23(b)(3), the dilution
effect would raise doubt about whether the class action “is superior
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy” because a plaintiff would arguably be better off
pursuing an individual claim free from the dilution effect.125 Thus, a
low class action damages cap would make it difficult to assemble a
sufficiently numerous class of plaintiffs that can be fairly and
adequately represented and for which the class action is the superior
method of adjudication. If state damages caps are aggressively
ratcheted downward, they could be viewed by courts as the
functional equivalents of categorical bars to maintaining class action
122. Berger & Brounell, supra note 64, at 285.
123. Current state laws imposing damages caps on class actions generally range from between
$100,000 to $500,000. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 112, app. A for a list of state statutes
imposing class action damages caps.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
125. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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claims and therefore prohibited under Shady Grove. Whether this
problem actually arises will depend on the legislative strategies that
states adopt to regulate class actions in Shady Grove’s wake.
3. Shady Grove and State Regulation of
Class Certification Requirements
Some scholars have argued that where the Federal Rules provide
only general procedural guidance, they can function as procedural
vessels for state substantive rights in diversity cases.126 This would
permit states to promulgate specific standards for numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation applicable
to federal class certification proceedings.127 Following Shady Grove,
how viable is this conception?
Arguably, CAFA and Shady Grove constitute a Scylla and
Charybdis128 for such state regulations, creating a narrow channel
through which state laws embodying legislative class action policy
preferences can enter federal courts. Congress intended CAFA to
enable class action defendants to avail themselves of the federal
courts to avoid permissive state class action certification practices.
Now, however, with Shady Grove, it appears that state efforts to
restrict the availability of the class action device in federal courts
may also be incompatible with Rule 23. Justice Scalia’s gloss on
Rule 23’s language as conferring a federal right to proceed with a
class action when Rule 23’s requirements are met appeared
unequivocal:
Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly
empowers a federal court “to certify a class in each and
every case” where the Rule’s criteria are met. But that is
exactly what Rule 23 does: It says that if the prescribed
preconditions are satisfied “[a] class action may be
126. Watkins, supra note 40, at 298. For example, in Gasperini, the Court concluded that
Rule 59 provided a general procedural standard for ordering new trials, including for cases in
which damages were excessive, but held that a state rule providing a specific standard for
determining when damages were excessive could give substantive content to Rule 59’s general
procedural form. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996); Watkins,
supra note 40, at 298.
127. Watkins, supra note 40, at 299 (“[F]ederal courts should consider state certification
standards when deciding certification motions.”).
128. In Homer’s The Odyssey, Ulysses at one point must sail through a narrow, rocky
corridor, assaulted from either side by two monsters, Scylla and Charybdis. HOMER, THE
ODYSSEY 229–30 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Doubleday & Co. 1961).
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maintained”—not “a class action may be permitted.”
Courts do not maintain actions; litigants do.129
Justice Stevens sounded a similar note in his concurrence,
opining that “[f]ederal courts can and should interpret federal rules
with sensitivity to ‘state prerogatives,’ but even when ‘state
interests . . . warrant our respectful consideration,’ federal courts
cannot rewrite the rules.”130
While these comments suggest that the Court is inclined to
protect Rule 23 from state regulatory erosion, exploitation of
certification criteria will likely persist. By incorporating statutory
requirements into state laws that indirectly interact with Rule 23
certification criteria, state legislatures can limit federal class action
litigation despite CAFA and Shady Grove.131 Without strong
guidance from the Supreme Court, states are increasingly likely to
write, and lower courts are increasingly likely to accept, state laws
with such imbedded, indirect class action deterrents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court’s plurality opinion in Shady Grove fails to provide
lower courts with doctrinal clarity for analyzing future vertical
conflict-of-law issues. This highlights a peculiar internal tension in
the Court’s Erie jurisprudence. To advance Erie’s original
purposes—to deter forum shopping and disparate litigation
outcomes—the Court must provide clear vertical choice-of-law
standards for judges and lawyers. Uncertainty as to what the Erie
doctrine entails will in itself lead enterprising attorneys armed with
creative arguments to exploit the doctrinal morass to circumvent
adverse state or federal law. In this sense, Shady Grove undermines
Erie’s underlying policies and calls for the Supreme Court’s
reexamination.

129. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (2010)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted).
131. For example, the inclusion of a pre-suit demand requirement as an element of recovery
under a no-fault insurance statute creates a predominance problem for suits brought under Rule
23(b)(3) without any reference to the class action device in statutory language. See DWFII Corp.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 10-20116-CIV-UNGARO, 2010 WL 5094242 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 10, 2010) (distinguishing Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431).
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